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PER CURIAM. The petitioners are court stenographers who seek a declaration that the respondents, the New Hampshire Administrative Office of the Courts and the New Hampshire Supreme Court, are equitably estopped from firing them except for good cause based only upon poor job performance or misconduct. They have moved to recuse all current and retired supreme court justices who participated in issuing Administrative Order 2004-02, which initiated the process of terminating the petitioners’ employment.

The issues presently before the court in this divorce action arise out of plaintiff's efforts to discharge her counsel and to substitute a non-lawyer, Theodore Kamasinski, as her "attorney-in- fact." Based largely, although not entirely, upon Mr. Kamasinski's appearance, plaintiff has moved to recuse the undersigned justice from continuing to preside over the case. The defendant objects to the recusal motion and seeks to bar Kamasinski's appearance on the grounds that he is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Also before the court are a motion to withdraw and a motion for instructions filed by plaintiff's present counsel, Attorney Donald Kennedy, and a petition for access to court records filed by Mr. Kamasinski in his capacity as a private citizen. After reciting the pertinent facts, I address these various motions below.

The defendant was convicted on May 6, 1996 of one count of attempted felonious sexual assault, fifty-three counts of exhibiting or displaying child pornography, and 267 counts of possessing child pornography. He now moves for a new trial or, in the alternative, petitions for habeas corpus on the grounds of 1) ineffective assistance of his trial counsel; 2) violation of his First Amendment rights; 3) “failure of the Trial Judge and prosecutor to disclose a close personal and professional relationship;” and 4) prosecutorial misconduct and unfair prejudice which may have affected the jury. The New Hampshire Supreme Court previously upheld the defendant’s convictions. See State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638 (1999). As a result, the defendant acknowledges that his petition is a collateral attack on his convictions and concedes that he can only raise the issues in his motion in the context of an attack on the effectiveness of counsel.