Double Jeopardy (Fed) (6)

State v. McGurk, 2007-533 (N.H. S.Ct., Oct. 16, 2008)

HICKS, J. The defendant, Sean McGurk, appeals an order of the Superior Court (Burling, J.) denying his: (1) motion to vacate his conviction based upon ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) motion challenging his conviction as violating double jeopardy; and (3) motion for new trial and to withdraw guilty plea based upon the discovery of new evidence. We affirm.

State v. Hutchinson, 2007-403 (N.H. S.Ct., Mar. 7, 2008)

GALWAY, J. This is an interlocutory appeal from an order of the Superior Court (Nadeau, J.) denying a motion to dismiss the indictments against the defendant, Walter Hutchinson. See Sup. Ct. R. 8. We affirm and remand.

State v. Fuller, 01-S-1869, 02-S-072 - 073 (Hillsborough, North, Jun. 14, 2002)

The defendant, Jason Fuller, is charged with conspiracy to commit burglary, theft by unauthorized taking and receiving stolen property. The charges all arise out of the defendant's alleged participation in the December 5, 2000 burglary of the residence of Chester Chmiola at 56 Grant Street, Manchester. Among the items taken in the burglary were a Baretta handgun and two (2) two- dollar bills. Presently before the court are the following pretrial motions filed by the defendant: (1) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #4); (2) Motion to Suppress Statement (Doc. #5); and Motion to Suppress (Doc. #6). After reciting the pertinent facts, I address the motions in turn, concluding that the second motion must be granted while the first and third must be denied.

State v. Smoke Signals Pipe & Tobacco Shop, LLC, 03-S-317-I - 03-S-324-I, 03-S-328-I (Strafford, Sep. 23, 2003)

Smoke Signals Pipe & Tobacco Shop, LLC (“the defendant”) is charged with eight counts of selling drug paraphernalia in violation of RSA 318-B:2. The defendant filed the following motions in May, 2003, to which the State objects: Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Dismiss II, Motion to Quash and/or alternatively Motion for Bills of Particulars, Motion to Suppress, Motion to Elect One (1) Single Count and/or Motion to Consolidate Various Counts into One (1) Charged Offense. Co-defendant Susan Hargrove, an agent of the defendant charged with three counts of selling drug paraphernalia, joins in the defendant’s motions. Additionally, co-defendant Eric Marshall, an agent of the defendant charged with one count of selling drug paraphernalia, joins in the defendant’s motions and independently moves to dismiss the charge against him. The State objects. Following a July 21, 2003 hearing on these matters, and upon review of the parties’ arguments and the relevant law, the court finds and rules as follows.

State v. Foss, 03-S-426 (Merrimack, Oct. 23, 2003)

The defendant Donald Foss is charged with failure to provide child support to his two minor children in violation of RSA 639:4. Before the Court are defendant’s three separate motions to dismiss. These include: (1) RSA 639:4 is unconstitutional; (2) the defendant’s indictments are a violation of due process and (3) the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case. The defendant also moves the Court to authorize funds that were necessary to hire a constitutional expert in providing an adequate defense. The State objects. The Court held a hearing on this matter on October 16, 2003. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds and rules as follows.

Croft v. Warden, 01-E-066 (Merrimack, May. 22, 2001)

The petitioner, Sean Croft, is currently serving two consecutive sentences of 10 to 20 years at the New Hampshire State Prison following his conviction in the Strafford County Superior Court (Fauver, J.) of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA) (RSA 632-A:2, I(a), (b)) and first degree assault (RSA 631:1, I(a)). In this habeas corpus action, Croft originally sought resentencing on the grounds that: (1) his convictions of both AFSA and first degree assault violate the double jeopardy provisions of the state and federal constitutions because the offenses arise out of a single incident; and (2) the trial court committed a further double jeopardy violation when it imposed extended terms of imprisonment for both offense based upon the same factor, i.e., that the defendant "manifested exceptional cruelty or depravity in inflicting . . . serious bodily injury on the victim of his crime[s]." RSA 651:6, I(d).
Syndicate content