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This matter arises out of an alleged phone-jamming scheme during the November 2002 election. The background of this matter has been summarized in earlier orders. Therefore, the Court proceeds directly to the merits of the pending motions to dismiss, regarding which a hearing was held on April 11, 2006.

The plaintiff, Francis J. Cuddy, Jr., seeks a fair division of the partnership known as Manchester Firing Line Range, LLC ("MFLR"), in which both he and the defendant, James L. McLoud, were partners, and also the return of certain property that he claims the defendant misappropriated. The Court held a bench trial on the matter on April 24, 2007. On June 29, 2007, the Court issued an order making certain findings of fact, and further requesting both parties clarify their legal arguments. The Court held a hearing on the parties' subsequent motions on August 16, 2007. The Court incorporates the June 29, 2007 Order into this current order, and now finds and rules as follows.

This is a civil action for damages for sexual abuse committed against the plaintiff by Brother Beaulieu, a member of the Order of the Sacred Heart, a former teacher at Bishop Guertin High School, and a former staff employee at Camp Fatima. The plaintiff alleges he was sexually abused and molested by Beaulieu between 1972 and 1975 while a camper at Camp Fatima and a student at Bishop Guertin High School. The alleged abuse ended in the fall of 1975 during the plaintiffs junior year at Bishop Guertin when Beaulieu attempted to force the plaintiff to perform fellatio. After the forcible assault, the plaintiff left school and never returned.

The defendant, Cheshire Medical Center ("Cheshire") moves for summary judgment as to Counts I and III of the plaintiff, Anthony Eno's ("Eno"), medical malpractice claim. Eno objects to Cheshire's motion. For the reasons that follow, Cheshire's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

Plaintiffs are all of the children and grandchildren of Helen V. Meding, and are the sole income and remainder beneficiaries of the Helen V. Meding Trust (the Trust). The Trust names two cc-trustees, Attorney John L. Fairbanks and Dartmouth National Bank, the predecessor of defendant Fleet Bank - NH. The will appoints John Fairbanks as executor, and Dartmouth National Bank as alternate executor if Fairbanks dies or otherwise fails to qualify. On December 28, 1989, John Fairbanks was indicted by the Sullivan County- grand jury for theft. He immediately disappeared and has not yet been apprehended. There appears little doubt that Fairbanks, as executor, stole significant assets from the Meding Trust. Plaintiffs seek damages from defendant for the funds stolen by Fairbanks arguing that the Bank, as co-trustee, breached its fiduciary duties to-them as beneficiaries of the trust.

The plaintiffs, Frederick Amoche ("Amoche") and Jon Valliere ("Valliere") initiated this cause of action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against the defendant, Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Company ("GTL"). The plaintiffs each purchased credit life and credit disability insurance issued by the defendant insurer, as part of a retail installment sales contract for the purchase of an automobile. The plaintiffs are asserting five claims arising from the defendant's alleged breach of its contractual, statutory and fiduciary obligations to refund unearned premiums to the plaintiffs upon early loan repayment. The defendant now moves to dismiss all counts, arguing that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted [13]. The defendant also specifically moves to dismiss Valliere's claims. The plaintiffs object. For the reasons stated in this order, the defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED.

GALWAY, J. The defendant, Education Development Center, Inc. (EDC), appeals, and the plaintiff, Clark & Lavey Benefits Solutions, Inc. (C&L), crossappeals, from rulings of the Trial Court (Groff, J.). We affirm.

The petitioners, fifteen court stenographers currently employed with the New Hampshire Superior Court (“the superior court”), collectively bring this Petition for Declaratory Judgment requesting the court determine that respondents, the Administrative Office of the Courts (“the AOC”) and the New Hampshire Supreme Court (“the supreme court”), are equitably estopped from terminating petitioners as employees of the State of New Hampshire except for just cause based on poor individual job performance or misconduct. The respondents object and move to dismiss the petitioners’ petition, asserting, inter alia: (1) the petitioners have an adequate remedy at law and are therefore precluded from bringing this action in equity; and (2) the petition must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court conducted a hearing on May 21, 2004. For the following reasons, the respondents’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

Jeffrey Stone (“Stone”) initially instituted this action against defendant New England Document Systems, Inc., f/k/a New England Micrographics, Inc. (“N.E. Docs”)[1] for breach of contract, compelled payment of dividends, freeze-out of a minority shareholder, and judicial dissolution of the corporation. N.E. Docs interposed counterclaims, and moves for judgment on the pleadings as to most of Stone’s claims, and also seeks costs and attorney’s fees. Stone objects. The Court held a hearing on October 23, 2006. Upon consideration of the parties’ oral arguments and written submissions, and as described below, N.E. Docs’ motion is GRANTED only as to Stone’s first breach of contract claim, and his judicial dissolution claim, and no award of costs and attorney’s fees is entered.

Plaintiff asserts four claims against Attorney Groff: negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty, all arising from Attorney Groff's alleged duties to plaintiff; and negligence, arising from Attorney Groff's alleged duties to Republic, to which plaintiff is subrogated. The essence of plaintiff's claims is that Walsh was negligent in failing to find and report the Hancock mortgage, that Walsh's negligence is imputable to Attorney Groff, and that Attorney Groff is liable for his own negligence.