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The petitioner, Terry M. Bennett, M.D., brought an action under RSA chapter 91-A seeking an order requiring the New Hampshire Board of Medicine ("Board") to hold certain of its deliberations in public sessions. The Court held a hearing on the matter on December 12, 2005 and issued an order on December 15, 2005. Before the Court are the Board's Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Stay the Court's December 15, 2005 order. The petitioner objects to both motions. Considering the parties' arguments and the relevant law, the Court finds and rules as follows.

The respondent, Town of Merrimack, moves this Court to reconsider its order in which it enjoined the respondent from certain retirement plans established by the respondent for the petitioners. The respondent advocates that the petitioners are not likely to succeed on the merits, that monetary damages will provide an adequate remedy at law, that the balance of harms weighs in favor of the respondent, and that the injunction should not have been issued because the petitioners brought this action in the wrong venue. For the reasons set forth below, the respondent's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

At issue in plaintiffs' motion to compel are various documents that plaintiffs had sought from defendant New Hampshire Republican State Committee ("NHRSC") during discovery in this civil action. In earlier proceedings, the Court had entered various discovery orders. Plaintiffs assert that NHRSC has failed to comply with the discovery orders as entered by the Court. The items which presently appear to constitute the central focus of the plaintiffs' motion concern a report arising from an investigation of the underlying telephone jamming issues that had been conducted by legal counsel for defendant NHRSC, and its supporting documents. Counsel for NHRSC submits that the material at issue is protected by the attorney-client privilege as well as the attorney work-product privilege.

The court (Fauver, J.) issued an order on February 13, 2006, stating, in pertinent part: [T]he plaintiff requests "complete copies of any and all, documents received by you, your insurance company, or anyone on your behalf relating to the claims made by any and all parties in this case relating to the [subject accident]." The defendant objects, arguing this request is extremely overbroad and any letters and communications between the defendant and his counsel are subject to the attorney-client privilege. The court finds the insurance adjuster's claims file is not subject to the work product doctrine or the attorney-client privilege and may make any fact of consequence more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Thus, the defendant is ordered to disclose the insurance adjuster's claims file to the plaintiff. With respect to the remaining portion of the plaintiff s request, the court finds it is overly broad, burdensome, and vague.

DUGGAN, J. The minor plaintiff, Shelby Baxter, by and through her mother and next friend, Patricia Baxter, appeals the exclusion by the Trial Court (Hollman, J.) of two expert witnesses in her negligence action against the defendants, Charles and Kelly Temple. The exclusion of these witnesses resulted in dismissal of the plaintiff’s case. We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand.

In their motion for reconsideration, the plaintiffs ask the court to remand the case to superior court for a new trial. They argue that: (1) they failed to offer proof that the education property tax resulted in harm because they anticipated that it would be relevant only to the "remedy" phase of the litigation; and (2) this court announced a standard of proof that was much higher than the one they urged and expected. We find these arguments unpersuasive and address each in turn.

Pursuant to RSA 606:10 (2001), the State appeals the decision of the Superior Court (Coffey, J.) to exclude expert testimony concerning the identification of a fingerprint of the defendant, Richard Langill. We reverse and remand.

The instant proceeding arises out of Freedom Partners, LLC's ("Freedom") unsuccessful petition to operate as a utility and participate in the retail electricity market in New Hampshire. Freedom asserts that, as a result of its petition to the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission ("the Commission"), competition was introduced into the electricity industry. Freedom contends that it is entitled to a portion of the ensuing savings enjoyed by New Hampshire citizens because of the role it played in reducing the price of electricity in this state. On April 22, 2002, this Court granted a motion to dismiss filed by Public Service Company of New Hampshire ("Public Service Company"). Presently before the Court is Freedom's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of that order.