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DALIANIS, J. These consolidated cases are before the court on interlocutory transfer without ruling. See Sup. Ct. R. 9. We accept the facts as presented in the interlocutory transfer. See McDonald v. Town of Effingham Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 152 N.H. 171, 172 (2005). The defendants, Shannon Gallagher and Timothy A. Hughes, both pled guilty, pursuant to negotiated pleas, to their second offense of driving while under the influence (DWI). See RSA 265-A:2 (Supp. 2007). Driving records which showed that Gallagher had previously been convicted pursuant to RSA 265:82 (2004) (repealed 2007), and Hughes pursuant to RSA 265:82-a (2004) (repealed 2007), were the bases for the trial court’s finding that each was guilty of a second offense. Both filed motions to vacate their sentences, arguing that the sentences were illegal. They argued that RSA 265-A:18, IV (Supp. 2007) (amended 2008) (sentencing statute), as it existed at the time of their sentencing, did not allow prior convictions pursuant to RSA 265:82 or RSA 265:82-a to serve as a basis for enhanced penalties for a subsequent offense.

DALIANIS, J. These consolidated cases are before the court on interlocutory transfer without ruling. See Sup. Ct. R. 9. We accept the facts as presented in the interlocutory transfer. See McDonald v. Town of Effingham Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 152 N.H. 171, 172 (2005). The defendants, Shannon Gallagher and Timothy A. Hughes, both pled guilty, pursuant to negotiated pleas, to their second offense of driving while under the influence (DWI). See RSA 265-A:2 (Supp. 2007). Driving records which showed that Gallagher had previously been convicted pursuant to RSA 265:82 (2004) (repealed 2007), and Hughes pursuant to RSA 265:82-a (2004) (repealed 2007), were the bases for the trial court’s finding that each was guilty of a second offense. Both filed motions to vacate their sentences, arguing that the sentences were illegal. They argued that RSA 265-A:18, IV (Supp. 2007) (amended 2008) (sentencing statute), as it existed at the time of their sentencing, did not allow prior convictions pursuant to RSA 265:82 or RSA 265:82-a to serve as a basis for enhanced penalties for a subsequent offense.

GALWAY, J. The defendant, Peter Johnson, appeals his conviction in Superior Court (Lewis, J.) for driving while intoxicated, second offense. See RSA 265:82 (2004) (repealed and replaced by RSA 265-A:2 (Supp. 2007)); RSA 265:82-b (2004) (repealed and replaced by RSA 265-A:18 (Supp. 2007)). The defendant argues that the trial court erred in its jury instructions and in its answer to a question from the jury during its deliberations. We affirm.

DALIANIS, J. The defendant, David A. MacDonald, appeals his conviction in Superior Court (Fauver, J.) for driving while intoxicated, see RSA 265:82 (2004) (repealed, amended and reenacted as RSA 265-A:2, I (Supp. 2007) (effective January 1, 2007)). We affirm.

Duggan, J. The plaintiffs, Peter J. Rodgers and Christian Pare, appeal from a Superior Court (T. Nadeau, J.) order in favor of defendant Colby’s Ol’ Place, Inc. (Colby’s). The plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion to reallocate the award of damages. We affirm.

The issue presently before the court in this case is whether the defendant is entitled to collaterally attack the felony sentences he received following his convictions for two counts of driving while certified as an habitual offender, on the ground that the indictments alleged only misdemeanor level offenses. I conclude that the defendant is procedurally defaulted from challenging the sufficiency of the indictments to charge felony level offenses because of his failure to raise the issue before trial, at sentencing, or on direct appeal.

The defendant moves to suppress evidence obtained as a result of his seizure, asserting that he was illegally seized in violation of his rights under part I, article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Specifically, the defendant contends that the police officers did not have the necessary "reasonable and articulable suspicion" to seize his vehicle and requests that all evidence obtained as a result of that seizure be suppressed. The State objects. The relevant facts are as follows.

Lincoln & Carol Hanscom (“Plaintiffs”) have sued Linda O’Connell (“Defendant”) for damages for injuries suffered in an automobile accident. Before the Court is the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count III of the Plaintiffs’ Complaint. The Plaintiffs object. For the following reasons the Motion to Dismiss Count III is DENIED.

The defendant, Brett K. Cronin, has been indicted by the grand jury on a charge of aggravated driving while intoxicated. Because the indictment alleges that, while so driving, Cronin caused a collision resulting in serious bodily injury, the offense is a class B felony.