NHCaseLaw.com

GALWAY, J. The defendant, Peter Clark, appeals his convictions for possession of child pornography, see RSA 649-A:3 (2007), following a bench trial in Superior Court (O’Neill, J.) We affirm.

DUGGAN, J. The defendant, Marshall Zidel, appeals his conviction on nine counts of possession of child pornography, see RSA 649-A:3 (2007), arguing that the Superior Court (Lewis, J.) erred in denying his motions to dismiss. We reverse.

THAYER, J. The defendant, David Cobb, appeals his conviction for one charge of attempted felonious sexual assault, RSA 632-A:3, III (1996) and RSA 629:1 (1996), fifty-three charges of exhibiting or displaying child pornography, RSA 649-A:3, I(c) (1996 & Supp. 1998), and 267 charges of possessing child pornography, RSA 649-A:3, III(a) (1996), alleging numerous errors by the Trial Court (Nadeau, C.J.).

The defendant was convicted on May 6, 1996 of one count of attempted felonious sexual assault, fifty-three counts of exhibiting or displaying child pornography, and 267 counts of possessing child pornography. He now moves for a new trial or, in the alternative, petitions for habeas corpus on the grounds of 1) ineffective assistance of his trial counsel; 2) violation of his First Amendment rights; 3) “failure of the Trial Judge and prosecutor to disclose a close personal and professional relationship;” and 4) prosecutorial misconduct and unfair prejudice which may have affected the jury. The New Hampshire Supreme Court previously upheld the defendant’s convictions. See State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638 (1999). As a result, the defendant acknowledges that his petition is a collateral attack on his convictions and concedes that he can only raise the issues in his motion in the context of an attack on the effectiveness of counsel.

The defendant, Paul Zinck, is charged with numerous counts of Possession of Child Pornography, contrary to RSA 649-A:3, I(e) (Supp. 2004). On January 3, 2005, the court granted the defendant’s most recently filed Motion to Suppress in which he alleged, for the first time, that the State failed to conduct a search of his computer and related equipment in a timely fashion. Specifically, the defendant argued that the 18-month delay between the time the warrant was signed and the State’s first efforts to search his computer violated both the State and Federal constitutional protections against unreasonable searches. The State now moves this court to reconsider the order. For the reasons stated here, the motion is DENIED.