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DUGGAN, J. The petitioner, Douglas R. Guy, appeals an order of the Superior Court (Hampsey, J.) upholding the Temple Zoning Board of Adjustment’s (ZBA) denial of his application for a junkyard license. See generally RSA 236:110-:129 (1993 & Supp. 2007). We reverse and remand.

HICKS, J. The petitioner, Lawrence J. Dupont, appeals an order of the Superior Court (Smukler, J.) upholding a decision of the respondent, New Hampshire Real Estate Commission (commission), sanctioning him for violating provisions of the New Hampshire Real Estate Practice Act (the Act) in connection with a sales agreement involving a manufactured home. See RSA ch. 331-A (2004 & Supp. 2007). Dupont argues that paragraphs I and VII of RSA 331-A:4 exempt him from the Act’s requirements. See RSA 331-A:4, I, VII (2004). We affirm.

The petitioner, Terry M. Bennett, M.D., brought an action under RSA chapter 91-A seeking an order requiring the New Hampshire Board of Medicine ("Board") to hold certain of its deliberations in public sessions. The Court held a hearing on the matter on December 12, 2005 and issued an order on December 15, 2005. Before the Court are the Board's Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Stay the Court's December 15, 2005 order. The petitioner objects to both motions. Considering the parties' arguments and the relevant law, the Court finds and rules as follows.

The petitioner, Terry M. Bennett, M.D., originally brought this action challenging the manner in which the New Hampshire Board of Medicine ("Board") had been investigating and adjudicating complaints against him. The petitioner now moves for an injunction barring the Board from taking any further action relative to the complaints against him. The Board objects. The Court held a hearing on the motion on May 11, 2006. Considering the parties' arguments and the relevant law, the Court finds and rules as follows.

The defendant, City of Rochester ("City"), moves for summary judgment in cases 96-E-160, 96-E-165 and 97-E-123 arguing that the Supreme Court decision in New England Telephone and Telegraph Company v. City of Rochester, 144 N.H. 118 (1999) finally resolves the issue of whether the City's amendments to the plaintiffs' pole licenses are lawful. The plaintiffs object and file cross- motions for summary judgment. For the reasons stated in this order, the City's motion for summary judgment is granted and the plaintiffs' cross-motions for summary judgment are denied.

This case has a lengthy and well-litigated history. See Verizon New England, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 151 N.H. 263 (2004); New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Rochester, 144 N.H. 118 (1999); New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Franklin, 141 N.H. 449 (1996). To summarize briefly for purposes of this order, Rochester seeks to impose real estate taxes on Verizon for the public property used and occupied by its poles and wires. RSA 72:23, I. Verizon contends that Rochester’s selective imposition of the tax against Verizon alone violates its equal protection rights. Alternatively, if the application of the tax is ruled constitutional, Verizon seeks abatement. The trial of this matter took place from September 18 through September 21, 2006.