Indictment (7)

State v. Lamarche, 2007-295 (N.H. S.Ct., May. 30, 2008)

DALIANIS, J. The defendant, Ronald Lamarche, appeals his conviction after a bench trial in Superior Court (Fitzgerald, J.) of one count of being in New Hampshire without permission while on probation in another state. See RSA 651-A:25, IX (2007). We affirm.

State v. Knickerbocker, Jr., 2004-356 (N.H. S.Ct., Jul. 29, 2005)

NADEAU, J. The State appeals the Trial Court’s (Fitzgerald, J.) dismissal of an indictment against the defendant, George Knickerbocker, Jr., for second degree murder. We reverse and remand.

State v. Riendeau, 98-S-329, 98-S-1316 (Hillsborough, North, Nov. 14, 2001)

The issue presently before the court in this case is whether the defendant is entitled to collaterally attack the felony sentences he received following his convictions for two counts of driving while certified as an habitual offender, on the ground that the indictments alleged only misdemeanor level offenses. I conclude that the defendant is procedurally defaulted from challenging the sufficiency of the indictments to charge felony level offenses because of his failure to raise the issue before trial, at sentencing, or on direct appeal.

State v. Bean, 01-S-681-F (Strafford, Apr. 26, 2002)

The defendant is charged with Simple Assault, Attempted Murder, and two counts of First Degree Assault. The defendant moves to strike certain language from the indictment in docket number 01-S-681-F (“the indictment”), which charges him with two counts of First Degree Assault. The State objects.

State v. Fuller, 01-S-1869, 02-S-072 - 073 (Hillsborough, North, Jun. 14, 2002)

The defendant, Jason Fuller, is charged with conspiracy to commit burglary, theft by unauthorized taking and receiving stolen property. The charges all arise out of the defendant's alleged participation in the December 5, 2000 burglary of the residence of Chester Chmiola at 56 Grant Street, Manchester. Among the items taken in the burglary were a Baretta handgun and two (2) two- dollar bills. Presently before the court are the following pretrial motions filed by the defendant: (1) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #4); (2) Motion to Suppress Statement (Doc. #5); and Motion to Suppress (Doc. #6). After reciting the pertinent facts, I address the motions in turn, concluding that the second motion must be granted while the first and third must be denied.

In Re: Grand Jury Proceedings, 02-S-1154 (Hillsborough, North, Mar. 22, 2005)

The Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester moves for an order enforcing an audit provision contained in a non-prosecution agreement (“agreement”) between the New Hampshire Attorney General (“Attorney General”) and the Diocese of Manchester (“Diocese”). The agreement was approved by this court on December 10, 2002. The Diocese invokes the authority of this court, pursuant to Section 8 of the agreement, to compel the Attorney General to commence and pay for an audit provided for in Section 4. After consideration of parties’ pleadings and the arguments advanced at hearing, the court rules as follows.

State v. James, 01-S-279-F (Strafford, Jun. 5, 2001)

The defendant moves to dismiss an indictment for Aggravated Felonious Sexual Assault returned on April 19, 2001, claiming prosecutorial vindictiveness. The State objects. For the reasons stated in this order, the defendant's Motion to Dismiss the indictment alleging Aggravated Felonious Sexual Assault is DENIED.
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