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DUGGAN, J. The defendant, Scott Abram, appeals the sentence imposed by the Trial Court (McGuire, J.) upon remand from our decision in State v. Abram, 153 N.H. 619 (2006). We vacate and remand.

DUGGAN, J. The defendant, John Burgess, was convicted by a jury of attempted escape, see RSA 629:1 (2007); RSA 642:6 (2007), and possessing an implement for escape, see RSA 642:7 (2007). The Superior Court (Lewis, J.) sentenced him to ten to thirty years in prison on each indictment, to be served concurrent with each other and consecutive to sentences the defendant already was serving. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court violated his privilege against self-incrimination under Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution by using his silence as a factor in sentencing. We affirm.

The issue presently before the court in this case is whether the defendant is entitled to collaterally attack the felony sentences he received following his convictions for two counts of driving while certified as an habitual offender, on the ground that the indictments alleged only misdemeanor level offenses. I conclude that the defendant is procedurally defaulted from challenging the sufficiency of the indictments to charge felony level offenses because of his failure to raise the issue before trial, at sentencing, or on direct appeal.

On May 21, 1998, the defendant pled guilty to one count of Operating While Deemed An Habitual Offender. The Court (Manias, J.) sentenced him to not more than 9 nor less than 4 years in the New Hampshire State Prison, stand committed. Before the Court is the defendant's Motion for Dismissal of Felony Conviction/Resentencing, in which the defendant asks the Court to: 1) resentence him to a misdemeanor; 2) hold a hearing on the matter; and 3) issue a written finding of fact and rulings of law.